Privacy Policy for CacheBar

1. Introduction & Controller

We take your privacy very seriously. This Privacy Policy informs you about the processing of personal data in connection with the desktop application "CacheBar" (hereinafter "App").

The provider named below is the data controller within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the German Digital Services Act (DDG); Section 3 explains for which processing operations that is the case:

2. Scope & Categories of Processed Data

The App is a local-only clipboard management utility. When you run the App, it monitors and stores content copied to your macOS clipboard. Depending on what you copy, this data may include personal data or sensitive information such as text, passwords, private keys, contact details, links, or code snippets.

If you switch the "Keep copied images" setting on, copied pictures — screenshots above all — are stored as well, up to a size limit of 12 MB per picture taken off the clipboard as an image. A stored picture may show anything that was on your screen when it was taken.

If you switch the "Keep copied files" setting on, files you copy — in Finder or in any other application — are stored as complete copies rather than merely by name, up to the per-file size limit you choose in Settings (5 MB to 100 MB, 25 MB by default). Copying several files at once stores up to ten of them, one entry each. A picture copied as a file follows the "Keep copied images" setting instead. A stored copy holds the entire contents of that file and can therefore contain any personal or confidential data the file itself contains; it stays on your Mac and can be pasted back as a file or written back out to disk from within the App. Copies are kept independently of the original: deleting or changing the original file does not change the copy, and deleting the entry in the App deletes the copy. Folders are never stored. Once stored pictures and files together exceed 2 GB, the oldest of them are deleted automatically; pinned entries, your Space and your notes are exempt.

For each entry the App also records which application was in the foreground when you copied it: that application's name and its bundle identifier. This is shown on the entry so you can tell your clips apart, and it is used for the exclusion list described in Section 12.

Monitoring only begins after you have confirmed the welcome screen described in Section 14. Content that matches your Private Filter, content copied out of an application you have excluded, and content that other applications mark as concealed or temporary, is discarded before it is stored (see Section 12).

In addition to copied content, the App stores notes that you write yourself in its "Notes" area, and clips you have joined together using its merge function. Both are kept in the same local database as your clipboard history and are never transmitted.

The App also stores what it works out about an entry by itself: the text read out of a stored picture, the contents of any codes in it, a one-line headline for a long entry, and a marker recording that an entry was recognised as sensitive and locked. All of these are derived from content that is already stored, are kept in the same local database, are deleted together with the entry, and are described in Section 13.

3. Purpose & Legal Basis of Processing

CacheBar processes the contents of your clipboard exclusively on your device and on your behalf; they never reach the developer at any point. Where personal data of other people is involved because you copied it, that happens within your own sphere of responsibility — for purely personal or household purposes, Art. 2(2)(c) GDPR applies to you.

The developer is a controller within the meaning of Art. 4(7) GDPR only for the processing described in Sections 5 and 16, where data actually reaches him.

• The local processing of clipboard data provides the App's history, pinning and storage features at your request; it takes place solely on your device.
• The on-device analysis described in Section 13 makes stored entries findable again and keeps recognised secrets out of sight; it takes place solely on your device, and only as far as you have switched it on or asked for it.
• System settings and preferences are stored locally so that the App remains functional and configurable.

4. No Data Collection, Transmission, or Selling (CCPA/CPRA)

We do not collect, store, transmit, or share your clipboard data or settings on external servers. The App operates completely offline; it is distributed without the network entitlement that macOS requires for outgoing connections. The on-device analysis described in Section 13 changes nothing about this: it uses functions built into macOS that answer on your device. We do not sell, rent, or lease any personal data, nor do we share it with third parties. Under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) / California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), this constitutes a complete "No Sale / No Share" policy.

5. App Store, Payments & Telemetry

The App is distributed through the Apple App Store, operated by Apple Distribution International Ltd. or Apple Inc. ("Apple"). Apple processes your store account, billing info, and downloads according to Apple's own privacy policy. CacheBar does not integrate any third-party analytics SDKs (such as Google Analytics or Firebase) inside the App. We only receive anonymous, aggregated crash reports and installation statistics from Apple if you have consented to share them.

6. Do Not Track (DNT) Signals (CalOPPA)

Pursuant to the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), we disclose that because the App does not collect user data or track your online activities across third-party websites or services, it does not track you and does not respond to "Do Not Track" (DNT) signals.

7. Children's Privacy

The App is not directed at children under the age of 13 (or 16 in the EU/UK). We do not knowingly collect or process personal data from children. Since all data is stored strictly locally on your device, we have no access to it.

8. Data Security & Storage

All data is stored locally in a SwiftData SQLite database inside the App's macOS sandbox container. Access is limited by macOS file permissions and sandbox protection. The App does not encrypt this database itself; on disk it is protected by FileVault if you have switched it on. This also applies to locked entries (Section 13): the lock keeps them out of sight within the App, it does not encrypt them. Depending on your macOS settings, local containers may be backed up to your personal iCloud Drive or Time Machine backups. The security of these backups is governed by your Apple iCloud and system settings. Stored pictures and stored copies of files are held as separate files beside that database, inside the same sandbox container. When you paste a stored file, the App writes it out once more into its own temporary folder inside that container so the receiving application can read it; those temporary copies are deleted the next time the App starts. Private Filter entries are the exception: they are not kept in this database but in the macOS Keychain, as described in Section 12.

9. Data Retention & Deletion

Your history size is limited to your preference (50, 100, 250, 500 or 1000 items). The limit applies to unpinned history entries: once it is reached, the oldest of them are automatically deleted. Pinned entries, items saved to your Space, and notes you have written yourself are not subject to this limit and are kept until you delete them. You can clear the entire history, your Space, or your notes at any time from the settings menu. Entries that match a newly added Private Filter entry are deleted immediately, including entries in your Space and notes you wrote yourself.

If the database can no longer be opened after a defect, CacheBar sets it aside under a new name in the same folder instead of deleting it, and says so in its window. That copy holds your previous history and is subject neither to the history limit nor to clearing from the settings menu; you can delete it directly from that notice.

If you remove CacheBar, the App's data folder at ~/Library/Containers/com.aaronwuest.ClipKeep and your Private Filter entries in the macOS Keychain remain until you delete them yourself. Clear your history, your Space and your notes from the settings menu, and your Private Filter list with "Remove all", before removing the App if you want nothing left behind.

10. Your Rights under GDPR & CCPA

You have the right to access, rectify, delete, restrict processing, or export your data. Because we do not collect or store any of your data on external servers, we cannot access, retrieve, or delete it for you. You can exercise all of your rights directly on your device by copying, editing, or deleting entries in the App, or by deleting the App and the data described in Section 9.

11. Right to Lodge a Complaint with a Supervisory Authority (Art. 77 GDPR)

Pursuant to Article 77 of the GDPR, you have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority if you believe that the processing of personal data relating to you infringes data protection laws. The competent authority for the developer's place of business is:

12. Private Filter, Concealed Content & Biometric Protection

The App provides a "Private Filter": a list of texts (for example passwords, keys or account numbers) that must never enter the clipboard history.

• Storage: Entries you add — by hand, or straight from a locked clip, in which case CacheBar suggests a name made from the parts that are not the secret: the variable it was assigned to, the issuer's prefix, the card scheme, never the secret itself — are stored exclusively in the macOS Keychain of your device. They are marked as available only while the device is unlocked and as non-syncing ("this device only"), which means they are not written to the App's database, not written to plain configuration files, and not transferred to any server or to another device by the App.
• Biometric access: Viewing, adding, or deleting entries requires you to verify your identity: with Touch ID, or with your macOS account password, which macOS always offers as an alternative and which is the only option on Macs without a biometric sensor; macOS may also accept a paired Apple Watch. This verification is performed entirely by macOS through Apple's LocalAuthentication framework. The App only receives the result (successful / not successful). The App and the developer have no access to your fingerprint or to any other biometric data, and no biometric data is stored or processed by the App.
• Effect: Clipboard content containing one of your entries (case-insensitive) is discarded immediately and is never written to the database. Existing entries that match a newly added filter are deleted automatically.
• Availability: If the Keychain cannot be read at the moment it is needed, and entries are known to exist, the App records nothing at all until it can be read again, and says so in its window. It does not fall back to recording unfiltered.
• Excluded applications: Separately from the text list, you can name applications whose copies are never recorded. The list holds each application's name and bundle identifier and is stored in the App's local settings (macOS user defaults). Anything copied while such an application is in the foreground is discarded before it is stored.
• Concealed content: Independently of your own list, the App by default ignores clipboard content that other applications, in particular password managers, mark as concealed, transient, or auto-generated. This covers the common pasteboard markers (for example "org.nspasteboard.ConcealedType"). Apple's Passwords app and Keychain Access put a copied password on the clipboard without any such marker, so the App also ignores anything copied while one of them is in front. A password copied out of Safari's AutoFill carries no marker either and cannot be told apart from other text copied in Safari; it is stored like any other copy unless you add it to the Private Filter or exclude Safari. This behaviour can be switched off inside the Private Filter settings.
• Limitations: The filter can only act on markers set by other apps, on a copy coming from one of Apple's password apps, and on the text you entered yourself. It matches text, so it cannot inspect the contents of a stored picture or of a stored file; a file is only checked by its name. The text CacheBar reads out of a picture is checked against your list before it is stored (Section 13), but the picture itself stays as it is. Use the exclusion list, or switch image and file storage off, where that matters. It is a convenience feature and cannot guarantee that every sensitive item is recognised. You remain responsible for the content you copy, including credentials and other sensitive data.

13. On-Device Analysis (Text Recognition, Locking, Apple Intelligence)

Beyond storing your clips, the App analyses them on your device in order to make them findable again and to keep recognised secrets out of sight. "Entry" in this section means everything the App holds: the history, your Space and the notes you wrote yourself. Everything described here runs locally, through functions built into macOS. Nothing is transmitted; the App continues to ship without the network entitlement that outgoing connections would require. You decide about the three parts that run by themselves — text recognition, the lock and headlines — on the welcome screen described in Section 14, and you can switch each of them on or off separately under Settings > Privacy & Intelligence. "Ask your history" has no such switch because it never happens by itself: it runs only when you press the ✨ button beside the search field and submit a question. Switching a part off takes effect immediately and also removes what it had produced: the text read out of pictures and the headlines are deleted, and the entries the lock is holding are released — apart from the one case named below.

• Text and codes in pictures: Apple's Vision framework reads the text in a stored picture and the contents of any QR codes or barcodes in it. The result is stored with that entry and added to the search index, so that a screenshot can be found by what it shows instead of only by the application it came from. It is shown on the entry, can be copied from it, and is deleted together with it. Text that matches your Private Filter is not stored: what the filter keeps out of the history is not written down out of a picture either. Such a picture is locked as well, because it demonstrably shows something you asked never to be recorded — it is not deleted, the window says why it is locked, and you can take the lock off it for good. This works on every Mac the App supports and does not require Apple Intelligence.
• Locking of sensitive entries: a rule-based scan examines the text of an entry — copied text, the text read out of a picture, and a note you wrote yourself — for well-known formats: private keys, issued API keys, access tokens, passwords written out in a configuration line, payment card numbers (verified by their checksum) and IBANs (verified by their checksum). A matching entry is marked as locked. Its content is then no longer displayed, no longer written into the search index, and not placed on the clipboard until you have verified your identity as described in Section 12. That verification is performed entirely by macOS through Apple's LocalAuthentication framework; the App receives only the result (successful / not successful) and has no access to biometric data. An unlock applies to that one entry and lapses after two minutes, when the Mac sleeps, when the screen is locked and when the App quits. What is stored is a marker naming the kind of secret that was recognised, never a second copy of the secret itself. Taking the lock off an entry for good asks for the same verification, since it makes readable what was not; from then on that entry is left alone, and copying the same text again lands on it rather than producing a new, locked one. Switching the lock off in Settings asks for the same verification, since it releases every locked entry at once. A picture locked because it matches your Private Filter stays locked even while this switch is off: that list is your own, and a setting about key and card formats does not overrule it. The scan recognises known formats and cannot guarantee that every sensitive content is detected; anything that must never be stored at all belongs in the Private Filter described in Section 12.
• Headlines and asking your history (Apple Intelligence): on a Mac on which Apple Intelligence is available and switched on, the on-device model that is part of macOS writes a one-line headline for long entries; that headline is stored with the entry. What it is shown for that is the entry itself — for a picture, the text read out of it. Locked entries are given no headline. On request, and never by itself, the same model answers questions about your history ("Ask your history"). For that, excerpts of up to 300 of your most recent entries are passed to it, and from all three lists: the history, your Space and your notes. An excerpt holds the beginning of the entry, its headline, the application it came from and when it was copied; for a picture it is the text read out of it — a picture with no recognised text is not passed at all — and for a stored file its name rather than its contents. Locked entries are excluded entirely. The question and the answer are not stored, and are shown only until you close CacheBar's panel in the menu bar; the next time it opens, they are gone. This model runs on your device. CacheBar does not use Apple's "Private Cloud Compute" for either feature. Headlines and answers are written by a language model: they can be wrong or incomplete and are no substitute for reading the entry itself. Macs without Apple Intelligence simply do not offer these two functions; everything else described in this section works there.
• Translation: on request, an entry is translated into a language you pick, using Apple's translation function. If the language is not yet present on your Mac, macOS offers to download it; the translation itself is then performed locally. The translated text is shown in the App's window and is placed on the clipboard only if you copy it; it is not stored as an entry.
• Writing Tools: where macOS offers Writing Tools, they are available in the App's text fields, exactly as they are in any other application's text fields. Whether and how Apple processes a request made there — on the device, or through Apple's "Private Cloud Compute" — is determined by macOS and by Apple's privacy policy, not by CacheBar. The App does not start such a request itself; it only permits its text fields to offer the function, and it never does so for entries recognised as code.

14. Your Confirmation Before Processing (Onboarding)

On first launch — and again whenever what the App processes changes materially — the App shows a short welcome screen on which you must confirm that you have read this Privacy Policy, and on which you decide whether copied pictures and files are kept as well and whether the App analyses your clips on your device — the text recognition, the lock and the headlines described in Section 13. Until you confirm, the App does not read or store any clipboard content.

Your confirmation, the date of the confirmation, and the version of the policy are recorded locally in the App's settings (macOS user defaults) and are not transmitted. Because all processing takes place locally and no data reaches the developer, this confirmation serves transparency purposes under Art. 12 and 13 GDPR; it is not a consent within the meaning of Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR.

15. Effective Date & Changes to this Policy

This Privacy Policy is effective as of October 6, 2026 and replaces the version of October 4, 2026. We may update this policy from time to time. Updates will be bundled with App releases and updated directly inside this document.

16. Support

Choosing the support entry in the menu opens a prepared email in your mail application. What you write to us is processed solely in order to handle your request (Art. 6(1)(b) and (f) GDPR) and is deleted once the request has been dealt with and no retention obligations stand in the way. The App itself transmits nothing; it does not have the network entitlement that would be required for that.